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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEE M. HOUSLEY and
REESE C. HOUSLEY
P'laintiffs-Appel'lants

vs.
THE ANACONDA COMPANY, a
corporation and DENNIS P. COX,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No.
10612

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Anaconda Company, hereinafter referred to as
"Anaconda" and Dennis P. Cox, hereinafter referred to as
"Cox" do not adopt the statement of facts set forth in the
brief of Shirlee M. Housley and Reese C. Housley, hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs".
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff's brief
is incomplete and inaccurate. A chronological review of
the proceedings in the trial court should be helpful.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 5, 1959, Cox, a resident of the State of
Utah, was driving a motor vehicle owned by the Anaconda
Company east on 5th South in Salt Lake City. (R 58) He
was following a 1954 Chevrolet sedan driven by plaintiff
Shirlee M. Housley and owned by plaintiff Reese C. Housley. As the two vehicles approached the intersection of
5th South and 4th East, the driver of another vehicle
proceeding south on 4th East failed to stop for the stop
sign on the northwest corner of the intersection. Shirlee
Housley slammed on her brakes to avoid colliding with the
car which ran the stop sign. Cox was unable to stop in
time and collided with the rear of the Housley vehicle.
(R 132) Cox was on his way home for lunch at the time
of the accident. (R 134)
On the 22nd day of February, 1959, Cox left the State
of Utah to accept employment in Brazil, South America.
(R 58) Cox lived in Brazil for approximately two years
then returned to the United States and now resides in
Bethesda, Maryland. (R 58)
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Anaconda and Cox
on September 27, 1960. Anaconda was served on September 28, 1960. (R 7) Cox has never been served in the
State of Utah.
Three years after the complaint had been filed, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. (R 15) The amended
complaint contained an additional count alleging in substance that Cox had a "chose in action against his employer and the employer's insurance carrier upon which in
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rem jurisdiction (could) be acquired." (R 19) Cox's attorney made a special appearance to object to the motion to
amend the complaint on the ground Cox did not have
property in the State of Utah which could be made the
subject of an in rem proceeding. (R 60)
The motion was heard before Judge Jeppson who ruled,
after considering memorandums filed by both sides, that
plaintiffs could amend their complaint. (R 61) Judge
Jeppson further ruled that Cox had made a special appearance challenging jurisdiction over his person and such
appearance did not constitute a general appearance. (R 61)
Cox was served with the summons and amended complaint in Bethesda, Maryland on January 19, 1964. (R 27)
A \Vrit of Garnishment was served on The Travelers Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Travelers")
on March 4, 1964. (R 42) Travelers answered the interrogatories attached to the Writ of Garnishment by stating
that it was not indebted to Cox and did not have under
its control any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights,
credits or choses in action of Cox. (R 44) Travelers further
answered the Writ of Garnishment by statinp- it did insure
Anaconda at the time of the accident in question and the
definition of the "insured" included anyone who was using
the motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured. (R 45) Plaintiff's did not reply to Travelers answers
to the interrogatories.
Cox filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
the ground the court did not have jurisdiction over his person and to quash the summons on the ground he was not
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served in the State of Utah. (R 33) The motion was
supported by the affidavit of Cox in which he stated at
the time of the accident (January 1959) he was a resident
of the State of Utah and on or about the 22nd day of February, 1959, he left the State to work in South America.
(R 58)
Cox further stated that after living in South
America for two years he returned to the United States
and became a resident of Bethesda, Maryland. (R 58)
The motion to dismiss and to quash summons was denied by Judge Aldon Anderson. (R 62, 63) Cox filed a
motion for rehearing asserting that the order denying the
motions to dismiss and quash summons deprived him of
his property without due process of law, contrary to the
provisions of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, and contrary to the provisions of the XIV
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(R 64)
The motion for rehearing was argued before Judge
Anderson. Briefs were filed by plaintiffs and Cox. The
Judge granted the motion of Cox to quash summons. (R 82)
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to set aside the order
quashing summons. (R 84) This motion was also argued
before Judge Anderson. At the hearing on the motion
to set aside the order quashing summons, Judge Anderson ruled that the order quashing summons be set aside
and the parties be permitted to file additional briefs. After
considering the briefs, Judge Anderson ruled that the
motion to set aside the order quashing summons be denied. (R 127) Judge Anderson stated that in his opinion
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the prior ruling of Judge Jeppson allowing the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint did not preclude him from granting the motion to quash summons. (R. 102)
At the pretrial Anaconda Company moved for a summary judgment on the ground Cox was not in the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident. (R 132) The
motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of Cox, stating in substance, that at the time of the
accident he was on his way home to have lunch with his
wife and he had no intention of going into the field after
lunch. (R 134)
The motion for summary judgment was argued before
Judge Merrill C. Faux. Plaintiff's and Anaconda submitted
memoradums in support of their positions. The motion for
summary judgment was granted by Judge Faux. (R 160)
Plaintiffs have appealed; (1) from the order of Judge
Jeppson holding Cox made a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction over his person; (2) from the order of
Judge Anderson quashing the service of summons on Cox
and (3) from the order granting summary judgment in
favor of Anaconda.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
COX HAS NOT WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint came
on for hearing before Judge Jeppson on November 6, 1963.
The amended complaint contained an additional count alleging in substance that Anaconda had a policy of liability
insurance insuring itself and any person using an owned
vehicle with the permission of the insured, all in accordance with the provisions of Section 41-12-21 (b) (2) Utah
Code Annotated 1953 (Safety Responsibility Act). The
amended complaint also contained the allegation:
"That, whether contained in said policy or not,
by express provision of Section 41-12-21 (f) (1),
Utah Code Annotated .... 'the liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance
required by this act shall become absolute whenever
injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle
liability occurs ... .'
The final allegation was that Cox had a "valuable chose
in action against his employer and the employer's insurance
carrier upon which in rem jurisdiction (could) be acquired."
(R 18, 19)
Cox's attorney made a special appearance to object to
the motion to amend on the ground Cox did not have any
property in the State of Utah which could be made the
subject of an in rem action. (R 60)
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The reporter's transcript of the hearing on the motion
to amend shows the following proceedings were had:
THE COURT: This motion is to amend as to Mr.
Cox, is it not?
MR. FULLER:
Honor.

Essentially as to Mr. Cox, your

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that?
MR. NEBEKER: We would object to that-appearing especially for that purpose, yes.
THE COURT: What is your objection?
MR. NEBEKER: Our objections are, your Honor,
the amendment relies apparently upon the
financial responsibility, which we maintain does
not apply, and we have produced an affidavit
from Mr. Reece of that division stating that
Mr. Cox was never required to obtain proof of
financial responsibility.
THE COURT: You do not represent Mr. Cox?
MR. NEBEKER: We are appearing especially for
that purpose, your Honor.
THE COURT: You do not represent Mr. Cox?
MR. NEBEKER: For the purpose of resisting this
amendment, yes. No jurisdiction over Mr. Cox,
that is the problem.
THE COURT: Are you Mr. Cox' attorney?
did not so state.

You
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MR. NEBEKER: Yes, I would represent here we
are representing him for the purpose of this
amendment.
THE COURT: Do you want to argue he cannot
state a cause of action against Mr. Cox?
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: I will hear the matter when we get
to it.
The bulk of the argument of counsel was not reported.
(R 167)
On December 5, 1963, a minute entry was made stating
Judge Jeppson's ruling:
"Court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend and
orders that plaintiffs may plead in rem and issue
garnishment requested. Court finds defendant did
not make general appearance and did not waive his
defense of no jurisdiction." (R 67)
At the hearing on Cox's motion to dismiss and to quash
summons, a question arose concerning Judge J eppson's
prior ruling on the motion to amend. On May 19, 1964,
Judge Jeppson signed the following order:
"Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has a chose in action
under a liability insurance policy which can be
reached by plaintiffs to acquire in rem jurisdiction
in these proceedings, and plaintiffs' motion to
amend their complaint accordingly is hereby granted
and garnishment may issue as requested.
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2. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has made a special
appearance herein challenging personal jurisdiction
over his person, and that such appearance did not
constitute a general appearance since the aforesaid
ruling of the court that in rem jurisdiction can be
had herein is considered by the court to be a special
appearance." (R 60-61)
Judge Jeppson, after hearing all the argument by counsel, held that Cox's attorney had made a special appearance challenging j uridsiction over his person and had not
made a general appearance.

Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
was amended slightly from Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules, has abolished the old distinction of special and general appearance. A defendant need no longer appear
specially to attack the court's jurisdiction over him. There
is no penalty if the attorney undertakes a "special appearance" though the label will be of no legal significance.
"There is no longer any necessity for appearing
specially, as subdivision (b) provides that every
defense may be made either in the responsive pleading or by motion. However, there is no penalty if
the pleader, mindful of the old ways, undertakes a
'special appearance' though the label will be of no
legal significance." Vol. lA Barron & Holtzoff
Rule 12 Sec. 343 p. 284.
In Orange Theatre Corporation v. Ray Hertz Amusement Corp. 139 F.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1944) cert. den. 322
U.S. 740, 88 L.ed. 1573, 64 S.Ct. 1057, it was held that
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has abo~
ished the age old distinction between general and special
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appearances. The court stated that under the Rule, a
defendant need no longer appear specially to attack the
Court's jurisdiction over him and is no longer required
"at the door of the Federal Courthouse to intone that ancient abra cadabra of the law de bene esse, in order by its
magic power to enable himself to remain outside even while
he steps within." However, the court pointed out that
under the rules if the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the
person was not raised by Motion before Answer or in the
Answer itself, it would be treated as waived, not because
of the defendant's voluntary appearance but because of his
failure to assert the defense within the time prescribed
by the rules.
A number of State Courts have adopted Rules of Procedure based on the Federal Rules. The Supreme Courts
in those jurisdictions have recognized that the distinction
between general and special appearances has been
abolished.
In D. W. Onan & Sons v. Superior Court, 179 P.2d
243 (Arizona 1947) the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
under Rule 12 (b), Sec. 21-429 ACA 1939, that special
appearances to challenge jurisdiction over the persons were
not necessary. The court stated that if the defendant so
desires, he may present every defense or objection that he
has in an answer without waiving any rights. The court
further stated :
"An objection that the court has not secured
jurisdiction over the defendant may be pleaded in
the answer. Often times a defendant might prefer
to raise certain objections which he believes will
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be sustained before resorting to the trouble of
pleading an answer. This he may do. Under this
Rule 12 (b) he may raise any or all of the following objections which he may have by motion: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5)
insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
In Treadwell v. The District Court in and for the City
and County of Denver, 297 P. 2d 891 (Colo. 1956) the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that Rule 12 (b) abolishes
the distinction between general and special appearances.
The court stated that if a motion to quash for lack of
jurisdiction of a person is made before the Answer, then
the jurisdiction of the Court over the person is properly
raised and stands in question until the Motion is disposed
of.

"The rule (Rule 12 (b)) is almost identical with
the federal rule of procedure and the federal cases
seem to hold that a party may appear generally and
still raise objections to jurisdiction of person. Such
a motion, of course, must be filed in apt time, and
the question cannot be raised after answers and
other motions as to the merits have been filed. It
cannot be contended that the written general appearance of counsel in the case is a defense; it cannot
be considered as a pleading; and it neither adds to
nor detracts from the motion to quash, which was
the only plea before the court." (Italics ours)
See also Weant's Admr. v. Ellis, 287 S.W. 2d 446 (Ky.
1955); Galler v. Slurzberg, 92 A.2d 89 (N.J. 1952) holding
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that Rule 12 (b) has eliminated the distinction between
general and special appearances.
These cases clearly show that the distinction between
general and special appearances has been abolished in those
jurisdictions which have adopted rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the instant case Cox's attorney appeared to resist the proposed Amendment to plaintiff's complaint on
the ground Cox had no property in the State of Utah which
could be made the subject of an in rem proceeding. The
substance of the appearance was to resist jurisdiction over
the person of Cox. If Cox could file a motion to dismiss
because of lack of jurisdiction over the person or could
plead such a defense in his answer, then clearly, an appearance to raise the question of jurisdiction over the person
before an answer or motion were required would not waive
that defense. There would only be a waiver of jurisdiction over the person if Cox's attorney answered the amended
complaint without raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. Rule 12 (h) provides that a party
waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by motion or in his answer, except the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
failure to join an indispensable party and whenever it appears the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
As the court stated in Orange Theatre Corp. supra.
"If the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the

person is not raised by motion before answer or in
the answer itself it is by the express terms of paragraph (h) of Civil Procedure Rule 12 to be treated
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as waived, not because of the defendant's voluntary
appearance but because of his failure to assert the
defense within the time prescribed by the rules."
(Italics ours)
The appearance of Cox's attorney to resist the motion
to amend the complaint did not give the court jurisdiction
over the person of Cox. The Trial Judge who heard the
arguments of counsel, held Cox made a special appearance
and did not waive his defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the person. (R 61) His ruling should be sustained.
POINT II.
COX HAS NO PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF
UTAH WHICH CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF AN
IN REM ACTION SO THE SUMMONS SERVED
ON HIM IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND, WAS
PROPERLY QUASHED.
Cox was served with a summons and amended complaint in Bethesda, Maryland. (R 27) A writ of garnishment was served on Travelers. It answered by denying
that it was indebted to Cox in property or money and
denying that it knew of or had any property, effects, goods,
chattels, rights, credits or choses in action owing to Cox.
Travelers admitted issuing a liability policy to Anaconda
which insured persons using motor vehicles with the permission of the named insured. (R 43-47) Plaintiffs never replied to the answer of the garnishee. Subsequently, Cox
filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint against him
on the ground the court did not have jurisdiction over his
person and to quash the summons. (R 33) The motion was
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supported by an affidavit in which Cox stated he was a
resident of the State of Utah at the time of the accident
and shortly thereafter moved to South America. The motion
to dismiss and to quash summons was heard by Judge Aldon
Anderson. The Judge granted the motion to quash summons
after the issues had been fully briefed and argued. (R 82,

127)

Defendants contend that the liability insurance policy
issued by Travelers to Anaconda does not constitute a "chose
in action" under Rule 64 (D) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which can be the subject of an in rem proceeding.
Rule 64 (D) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
contains the following provision relating to garnishment:
"When plaintiff entitled to writ; affidavit. The
plaintiff, at any time after the filing of the complaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue, and
attach the credits, effects, debts, choses in action,
money, and other personal property of the defendant
in the possession or in the control of any third person, as garnishee, whether the same are due at the
time of the service of the writ or are to become
due thereafter, under the same circumstances and
by filing with the court in which the action is pending an affidavit as required by subdivision (a) of
Rule 64C, relating to Attachments; provided, that
in addition to the requirements of the Affidavit for
a writ of attachment the affidavit for a writ of
garnishment shall state that plaintiff has good reason to believe and does believe that a particular
person, firm or corporation, private or public, has
property, money, goods, chattels, credits or effects
in his or its hands or under his or its control be-
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longing to the defendant, or that such person, firm
or corporation is indebted to the defendant."
Subparagraph (g) and (i) of Rule 64D contain the following provisions :
(g) * * * The garnishee may also deliver to the
officer serving the writ the property belonging to
the defendant, together with the money due to such
defendant, as shown by the answer of the garnishee,
and the officer shall make return of such property
and money with the writ to the court, to be dealt
with as thereafter ordered by the court. Thereupon
the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability
in the proceedings, unless his answer shall be successfully controverted as hereinafter provided.
(Italics ours)

* * *
(i) Judgment on Answer of Garnishee. If the
plaintiff fails to reply to the answer of the garnishee, he shall be deemed to have accepted it as
correct, and judgment may be entered thereon. * * *"
(Italics ours)

The plaintiffs did not reply to the garnishee's answer.
They are therefore deemed to have accepted as correct
Traveler's answer that it had no property, effects, goods,
chattels, rights, credits or choses in action of Cox. Plaintiffs failure to reply precludes them from questioning the
correctness of the answer.
Regardless of plaintiffs' failure to reply to the Answer,
the liability insurance policy is not a chose in action.
A "chose in action" is defined as "A right to personal
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things of which the owner has not the possession, but
merely a right of action for their possession." Blacks Law
Dictionary 3rd Edition, p. 323.
The term has also been held to include the right to
recover sums of money from another:
"The term "choses in action" is one of comprehensive import. It includes the infinite variety of
contracts, covenants and promises which confer on
one party a right to recover a personal chattel or a
sum of money from another by action." Sheldon v.
Sell 49 U.S. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147 cited in Vol. 7 Words
& Phrases, p. 167.
The language of the insurance policy issued by Travelers to Anaconda clearly shows that it does not constitute
a "chose in action". The policy contains the following pertinent provisions:
"INSURING AGREEMENTS

1. Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person and caused by accident. * * * (Italics ours)
CONDITIONS
13. Action Against Company. No action shall lie
against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with
all the terms of this policy, nor until the amount
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of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment against the
insured after actual trial or by written agreement
of the insured, the claimant and the company."
Under the terms of the insurance policy Travelers has
the obligation to pay on behalf of the insured (Cox) all
sums which he shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury. The insurance company
has no obligation to pay on behalf of the insured until he
becomes legally obligated to pay. Since Cox is not legally
obligated to pay the plaintiffs any sum of money, Travelers
has no monetary obligation owing on his behalf. The contract of insurance is conditioned on the insured becoming
legally obligated to pay. If there is no obligation on the
insured to pay, there is no obligation on the insurance
company. Unless a judgment is entered against Cox,
Travelers will have no obligation to pay any money on his
behalf.
The language of the paragraph relating to actions
against the Company specifically provides that no action
shall lie against the Company until its obligation to pay
shall have been finally determined either by judgment
against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company. It is
clear from this language that there is no monetary obligation owing on behalf of Cox until a judgment has been
entered against him, after actual trial, or a written agreement has been entered into between Cox, the plaintiffs
and the Travelers Insurance Company.
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Cox has no contractual rights against the Travelers
to pay money on his behalf until a judgment is entered
against him. The contract of liability insurance does not
constitute a chose in action because Cox has no right to
recover any money from Travelers.
The case of Gray v. Houck, 68 S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn.
1934) is on all fours with the facts in the instant case. In
that case the plaintiff Gray brought a suit against the defendant Houck wherein jurisdiction was asserted by a
petition for attachment by garnishment of the Travelers
Insurance Company as the debtor of the defendant. The
defendant Houck left the State of Tennessee before service
could be had upon him and jurisdiction was asserted by
garnishment of the Travelers Insurance Company as the
debtor of the defendant. The lower court found that the
insurance company was not indebted to the defendant and
for that reason denied the attachment by garnishment of
the insurance company and dismissed the suit. The language of the insurance policy in the Houck case was similar
to the language of the insurance policy issued to the Anaconda Company. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed
the decision of the lower court holding that under the automobile liability policy, the insurance company was not
subject to garnishment as the insured's debtor. The Court
said that since the obligation of the insurance company to
the insured was contingent and since there was no judgement rendered and no agreement made, no garnishment
could issue. The Court said:
"(1) The contract thus pleaded is clearly one

of indemnity against liability, but by the clause
last quoted the obligation of the insurer to pay
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and satisfy claims made against the insured arises
only when such claims are matured by judgment or
by written agreement of the parties interested, including the insurer. The language of the contract
is that 'no recovery against the company shall be
had until the amount of the insured's liability
shall have been determined by judgment or written
agreement.' A right of recovery is obviously essential to a right of action, so that, by the terms of
the contract, the insured has no right of action
for the indemnity stipulated, in the absence of judgment against him or an agreement fixing the amount
of plaintiff's damages. The existence of such right
of action is therefore contingent upon the rendition
of judgment against the insured, the defendant to
plaintiff's action for damages. That such event is
uncertain and contingent is at least indicated by the
plaintiff's inability to obtain service of process on
the defendant, by reason of the defendant's nonresidence."

The Court pointed out that it is a rule of universal
application that the plaintiff in garnishment is, in his relation to the garnishee substituted merely to the rights of
his own debtor and can enforce no demand against the
garnishee which the debtor himself, if suing, would not
be entitled to recover. The Court also stated that there
is an underlying principle controlling the right to attachment by garnishment, that the process can reach only debts
absolutely existing and those not subject to the happening
of a future event, rendering it uncertain whether the
garnishee will or will not be indebted to the defendant.
The Court then made the following observation:
"The defendant herein has not suffered damage
for which he is entitled to call upon his insurer for
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indemnity. Such damage wil arise only from a
judgment against him, or from a written agreement
fixing the amount of the liability, according to the
terms of the insurance contract. Until such contingency occurs, there can be no breach of the
contract to indemnify, and no right of action which
the defendant or his creditors can prosecute against
the insurer."
The Court concluded that under the liability indemnity
contract which it was construing, the obligation to pay
dated from the rendition of a judgment against the defendant and until such judgment was rendered the obligation was contingent and uncertain. The court held that
until the defendant's liability to the plaintiff was determined by judgment rendered in a personal action against
him, the insurer was not subject to garnishment as the
defendant's debtor.
Inasmuch as Travelers has no obligation to Cox until
his liability to the plaintiffs is determined by a judgment
rendered in a personal action against him, there is no chose
in action existing between Travelers and Cox.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Gray v. Houck, supra,
on the ground that the statutes of Tennessee prohibited
garnishment upon "debts or demands not due when the
debtor resides out of the state." No reference is made to
those statutes in the opinion.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee did state that attachment by garnishment was authorized by statute:
"This is an action for damages for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The
defendant, Houck, left the state before service could
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be had upon him, and jurisdiction is asserted in this
action, begun several years later, by petition for
attachment by garnishment of the Travelers Insurance Company, as the debtor of the defendant.
Such process is authorized by statute in behalf
of a tort claimed against one who is 'indebted' to
the defendant. Code, Sec. 9397, 9428, p. 117
The Court further stated that garnishment could only
reach debts absolutely existing.

"* * * It is also an underlying principle, controlling the right to attachment by garnishment, that
the process can reach only debts absolutely existing,
and those not subject to the happening of a future
event, rendering it uncertain whether the garnishee
will or will not be indebted to the defendant. * * *"
Page 118
The Tennessee court did not discuss the question of
whether the debt was due or not but rather was concerned
with whether the debt would ever exist. The Court found
that the obligation of the insurance company was contingent
and uncertain and until judgment was entered, the insurer
was not subject to garnishment.

This court has previously held that contingent unliquidated contract claims are not subject to garnishment.
In Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western Wholesale Notions
Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032 (1928) this court held
accounts receivable placed with the garnishee for collection,
but not collected, were not subject to garnishment. This
court held that the service of the Writ of Garnishment renders the garnishee liable for only such property, money,
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goods, chattels, credits or effects of defendant as were in the
possession of the garnishee and such indebtedness of the
garnishee in favor of the defendant as exists when the
writ is served. This court stated:
"It is one of the cardinal principles of the law
of garnishment that the garnishee is under no
greater liability to the plaintiff in whose behalf
the writ of garnishment is issued than such
garnishee was under to the defendant immediately
before the writ was served. The liability of the
garnishee to account to the defendant for property
or indebtedness must be absolute in order that such
property or indebtedness is garnishable." (Italics
ours)

While the applicable 1928 Utah statute did not contain the phrase "chose in action" as an item that could
be subject to garnishment, plaintiffs construed the statute
to include "chose in action" as the Writ commanded the
garnishee to retain in its possession all personal property,
effects, choses in action of the defendant debtor.

This court has held that an unliquidated tort claim is
not subject to garnishment.
In Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376
(1957) this court held that an unliquidated tort claim
against an automobile insurer was not a chose in action
held by the insurer for the insured. This court further
held that the insurer's liability, if any, was not subject to
garnishment and could not be adjudicated in a garnishment
proceeding brought by the holder of a judgment against
the insured. In that case the plaintiff, Paul, recovered a
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judgment against the defendant Kirkendall, in the sum of
$20,000.00 for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The Maryland Casualty Company had issued
a policy of insurance in favor of the defendant and paid
the judgment to the limit of its policy coverage of
$10,000.00 Plaintiff then sued out a writ of garnishment
which was served on the Maryland Casualty Company as
garnishee. In the interrogatories it was asked if the
garnishee was indebted to the defendant. The answer
to this question was negative. Plaintiff replied to the
answers alleging that the garnishee insurance company
was indebted to the defendant in the amount by which
the judgment taken against the defendant exceeded the
amount of the policy coverage. The plaintiff claimed that
the garnishee insurance company negligently and carelessly,
and in violation of its duty, failed and refused to settle
the case notwithstanding the garnishee knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the
defendant was liable to the plaintiffs for damages far in
excess of the limits of the policy. The lower court denied
the insurer's motion for summary judgment and it appealed. This Court reversed, holding that the insurer was
entitled to a summary judgment in its favor. The question presented on the appeal was whether or not the
liability of the garnishee insurance company alleged in the
plaintiff's reply to the garnishee's answer could be reached
by garnishment. This court in analyzing Rule 64(D)
(Garnishment) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure made
the following statement:
"It must be conceded that the purpose of our
garnishment staute is to enable a creditor to reach

24

and attach property described in Rule 64D belonging
to the judgment debtor, in the possession or under
the control of a third person. It must be apparent
that Maryland Casualty Company was not at any
time the holder or possessor of a chose of action
against itself belonging to the defendant. The
garnishment rule does not contemplate litigation of
a chose in action between the creditor and the garnishee. All garnishee is required to do is to hold
any property, goods, chattels, choses in action of
the defendant which the garnishee has in his possession. Garnishee is not required to litigate his
liability for a judgment under a chose in action held
by him. If the garnishee surrenders the property
of defendant being held by him and pays the money
due to defendant from him, he has no further obligation except to truthfully report." * * *
The Kirkendall case supra held that an unliquidated
tort claim is not subject to garnishment. Cox has no claim
in tort or contract against Travelers.
The issue is not whether the chose in action will become
due after the service of the writ, but whether or not any
chose in action exists. The language of Rule 64D "whether
the same are due or are to become due thereafter" means
that the debt or chose in action exists and is due at the
time the writ is served or will become due thereafter. The
rule does not contemplate that a debt or chose in action
which may come into existence after the writ is served is
subject to garnishment. If Travelers should breach its
insurance contract, Cox would have an unliquidated claim
for breach of contract. The unliquidated contract claim
(which Cox may or may not have at some future date)
is no more subject to garnishment than the unliquidated
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tort claim in the Kirkendall case. In both cases the claim
is contingent and subject to the happening of future events
which may or may not ripen the claim into a valid judgment.
Defendants contend that the Utah Safety Responsibility
Act, has no application to the case at bar.
Section 41-12-21 (f) (1) and (2) of the Act provides:

"* * * (1) the liability of the insurance carrier
with respect to the insurance required by this act
shall become absolute whenever injury or damage
covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs;
said policy may not be canceled or annuled as to such
liability by any agreement between the insurance
carrier and insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no statement made by the insured
or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall
def eat or void said policy;
(a) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment
for such injury or damage shall not be a condition
precedent to the right or duty of the insurance carrier to make payment on account of such injury or
damages * * *"
This section applies to policies that are required as
proof of financial responsibility. In Utah Farm Bureau
Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277
(1957), this Court held that Sec. 21 of the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act applies to those insurance policies
required by the Department to be furnished as proof of
financial responsibility after the owner or operator has
been involved in an accident or has violated the motor
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vehicle laws. This court further held that where the policy
of insurance in question had not been issued because it was
required by the Commission to furnish proof of financial
responsibility in conformance with the Act, the provisions
of the Act did not apply to it.
"It being conceded that the policy was not issued because Chugg had been required by the
Commission to furnish proof of financial responsibility in conformance with the Act, it fol'ows that
the provisions of the Act do not apply to it. Unless
Chugg had been within the purview of the Act when
the policy was issued, its provisions, unless illegal,
are subject to the same construction as any other
contract, in accordance with the expressed intent
of the parties." (Italics ours)

The defendants attached to their original memorandum
the affidavit of Ralph Westwood, the Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of the State of Utah, in which
he stated that at no time had Dennis P. Cox been required
to file with such division proof of "financial responsibility"
as defined in Sec. 41-12-1 (k) of the Utah Code Annotated (R 95).
Since the policy of insurance issued by Travelers to
Anaconda was not required by the Commission to furnish
proof of financial responsibility, the terms of the Act do
not apply to the policy in question. The policy of insurance issued by Travelers is subject to the same construction
as any other contract, in accordance with the expressed
intent of the parties.
It is obvious that the language of Sec. 41-12-21 does not
apply to the policy of insurance issued by Travelers to Ana-
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conda and therefore its liability is not "absolute" as claimed
by the plaintiffs. The language of Sec. 41-12-21 U.C.A.
does not fix liability on the insurance carrier without a
judgment entered against the insured. The Insurance
Company is only liable if the insured is negligent and such
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.
The language "the liability of the insurance carrier with
respect to the insurance required by this Act shall become
absolute'', means that the Insurance Company cannot cancel the policy or attempt to escape its obligation under the
policy. Its contractural obligation to the insured is "absolute" but it obviously is not liable to third persons unless
the insured is also liable.
Plaintiffs cite United States v. J. T. Hubbell, 323
F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1963) as authority for the proposition that plaintiffs may garnish the alleged contractual
right which Cox has against Travelers. That case involved
the question of priority of a federal tax lien and the claim
of certain contractors to determine which was entitled
to the proceeds of a state court judgment. The judgment
in the state court had been obtained by Lewis, a painting
subcontractor, against the Housing Authority of the City
of Dallas, which paid the amount of the judgment into
court and interpleaded the United States and the general
contractors. Lewis had been required by the Housing Authority to apply a second coat of paint on a housing project
at no extra cost to either the prime contractor or the Housing Authority. As a result of this extra work Lewis
became insolvent and one of his unpaid debts consisted
of withholding taxes due the government. After the filing
of the tax lien Lewis entered into an agreement with the
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general contractors to give them 35% of the amount recovered from the Housing Authority in consideration of the
general contractor's prosecuting the claim. The district
court held the general contractors were entitled to the
judgment pursuant to the assignment from Lewis. The
Circuit Court reversed holding the tax lien was perfected
prior to the assignment. In so holding, the court did rule
that the tax lien attached to the unliquidated tort claim of
Lewis. It is respectfully submitted that the question of
when a tax lien attaches has no bearing on the issues in
the instant case. There the court held the tax lien attached to an unliquidated tort claim. Here the plaintiffs
are attempting to garnish an alleged contract claim.
This court has previously held that an unliquidated tort
claim is not subject to garnishment. See Paul v. Kirkendall, supra. A suit involving the priority of a tax lien has
no application to an attempted garnishment of an alleged
contractual right to obtain personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs also cite the case of Ackerman v. Tobin, 22
F. 2d 541 (8th Cir. 1927) cert. den. 276 U.S. 628, 72 L.Ed.
739, 48 S.Ct. 321 (1928) as conclusive authority in favor
of the plaintiffs. This suit involved a claim under a
property insurance (robbery) policy and has no application
to the case at bar. The court held that an unadjusted
claim for loss under an "insurance policy'' is subject to
garnishment. The cases cited by the court as authority
for this proposition deal with claims under fire insurance
policies. The courts generally hold that claims under fire
insurance policies are subject to attachment or garnishment
when the proof of loss has been made and the claim has
been adjusted.
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"As a general rule, the right of an insured
against an insurance company under a policy of
insurance on property is subject to attachment or
garnishment at the suit of creditors of the insured,
at least where proof of loss has been made and the
claim has been adjusted." 6 Am. Jur. 2d page 679.
See 38 ALR 1072, 53 ALR 724 (Garnishment of Fire
Insurer)
An obligation exists under a fire insurance policy when
the fire occurs. No obligation exists under a liability insurance policy until the liability of the insured has been
established by judgment or agreement.
"Sec. 210. Generally; right of action in absence of
provision therefor. * * * If the contract is treated
as a contract of liability insurance, as distinguished
from a policy of indemnity insurance against actual
loss, the insurer is subject to garnishment by a person who has recovered judgment against the insured
for an injury covered by the policy where the company has waived any defense which it might otherwise have urged as against the insured. * * *"
(Italics ours)
7 Am. Jur. 2d, page 554.
The question of jurisdiction was not presented in either
of the cases cited by plaintiff as authority for their position.
Plaintiffs cannot convert an in personam action into
an in rem action. The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that if a suit involves the determination of personal
liability of a defendant, he must he brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process within the state or by
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his voluntary appearance before the proceedings will have
any validity.
The footnote in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed.
565 contains the following:
"The term 'due process of law', when applied
to judicial proceedings, means a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established by our system of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of
private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution to pass upon the subject matter of the
suit; and if that involves merely a determination
of the personal liability of the defendant, he must
be brought within its jurisdiction by service of
process within the State, or his voluntary appearance." (Italics ours)
In this case the cause of action against Cox follows him
wherever he goes. The plaintiffs can sue Cox in Maryland and if they are successful in obtaining a judgment,
then they may garnish the Insurance Company. But to
permit a personal judgment to be entered against Cox
under the label of an "in rem theory" would be completely
contrary to the constitutional rights of Cox.

Cox has no chose in action against Travelers. No
chose in action will come into existence until plaintiffs
obtain a judgment against Cox. Personal jurisdiction is a
fundamental prerequisite for an in personam action. If
Cox has any rights against Travelers they are contingent
and unliquidated. This court has held that neither unliquidated tort claims nor unliquidated contract claims are
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subject to garnishment. See Paul v. Kirkendall, Acheson
Hardin v. Western Wholesale, supra.
It is respectfully submitted that Cox has no property
in the State of Utah which can be the subject of an in rem

action.

The order quashing summons should be affirmed.
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POINT III
COX WAS NOT IN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT,
SO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
ANACONDA WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.
At the pretrial of this action Anaconda moved for
summary judgment. (R 133)
The motion was supported by the affidavit of Cox in
which he stated:
"At the time of the accident I was on my way
home to have lunch with my wife. I was living at
615 Grand Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. On a
number of occasions I used the car to pick up laboratory equipment on my way back to my office in the
Kearns Building. I picked up the laboratory equipment at Braun, Knecht & Heimann at 650 West 8th
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. I cannot now recall
whether I was going to pick up equipment after
lunch on the day of the accident.
I intended to return to the Anaconda office in
the Kearns Building after lunch, but whether I
was going to pick up laboratory equipment, I do not
recall at this time.
I had not intention of going into the field after
lunch." (R 134-135)
There is nothing in the record to controvert the undiputed fact that Cox was driving home to have lunch with
his wife when the accident happened. (Plaintiff's Brief,
page 36). Cox stated that on occasions he used the car to
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pick up lab equipment at Braun, Knecht & Heimann, 850
West 8th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. He could not recall
whether he was going to pick up equipment on the day of
the accident. Cox lived on the East side of town (Grand
Street begins at 965 East 7th South) and the place where
he was to pick up equipment was on the West side of town.
It is also undisputed that Cox intended to return to the
Anaconda office in the Kearns Building after lunch. He
had no intention of going into the field. (R 135)
Roland B. Mulchay, the Assistant Chief Geologist in
charge of geological work in the west for Anaconda, testified in his deposition that the company cars were not
supposed to be used on personal business. (Mulchay deposition p. 10, 11) Mulchay had no knowledge of why Cox
had the car at the time of the accident. (Mulchay deposition, p. 13) Mulchay further testified that Anaconda
employees were permitted to take company vehicles to
their homes in anticipation of field trips the following day.
(Mulchay deposition p. 13) Mulchay stated that a Malcolm
Kildale, now deceased, was the immediate supervisor of
Cox. Mulchay had no knowledge of what Kildale might
have authorized on the day of the accident. (Mulchay
deposition p. 12)
Anaconda admitted in its answer to plaintiffs amended
complaint that Cox was using the vehicle with express
permission. At the pretrial Anaconda moved to amend its
answer to deny that at the time of the accident Cox was
using the vehicle with express permission. The motion
to amend was denied by Judge Hanson. (R 133)
Whether Cox was using the vehicle with express permission or implied permission is immaterial. The con-
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trolling question is whether or not Anaconda received a
business benefit from Cox's use of the car.
This court has repeatedly held that an employer is
not liable for damage caused by his employee, unless the
employee is furthering his employer's business at the time
such damage occurs. If the employee is engaged in a purpose of his own, or in purposes other than the master's
business, he has departed from the scope of his employment and the master is not liable for his negligence. If
the vehicle is being used in the servant's personal or social
affairs, the master is not liable.
In Wright v. Intermountain Motor Car Company, 53
Utah 176, 177 Pac. 237 (1919) the servant who was employed to demonstrate automobiles, to accommodate an
out-of-town customer, took the automobile out after business hours for his own social affairs. This court held, as
a matter of law, that a master is not liable for injury
caused by its servant where the automobile is being used
by the servant for his own purposes.
In Fowkes v. G.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 46
Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53 (1915) this Court held that the
master was not liable for the acts of the servant where, at
the time of the accident, the servant was not discharging
any duty or transacting any business for the master. This
court stated that the test to determine whether a master
is liable for his servant is as follows :
"The test to determine whether a master is
liable to a stranger for the consequences of his
servant's misconduct is to inquire whether the latter
was doing what he was employed to do at the time
he caused the injury complained of."
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In Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of
California, 60 Utah 346, 208 Pac. 519 (1922) the servant
was employed to drive a delivery truck. After the servant
finished his deliveries on the day of the accident, he drove
his truck to his home and used it to move furniture for
himself. While the servant was on his way back to the
garage, he ran into and injured the plaintiff. This court
held that the driver was not acting within the scope of
his employment and that the employer was not liable.
In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. 2d 493 (1940)
the servant was employed to drive a delivery truck for the
master. The servant was not authorized to take passengers
in the grocery delivery truck without permission. On the
day of the accident, the servant had made four deliveries
when he agreed to give two girls a ride in the truck down
to the business section of Salt Lake City. After picking
up the girls, he made his last delivery. Thereafter the
servant became involved in a collision in which the plaintiff's son was fatally injured. This Court held that the
servant's action was not a mere deviation, but was a departure from the course of his employment and the master's
responsibility for the servant's act had ceased as a matter
of law.

These Utah cases clearly set forth the law in Utah
that where a servant is using his master's vehicle in
furtherance of his own personal affairs, he is not in the
scope of his employment and his master is not responsible
for injuries caused by the servant.
When an employee uses his employer's motor vehicle
to go from his place of employment to a place to eat, he
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is not in the scope of his employment in the absence of
some special benefit to his employer.
"An employee, in using his employer's motor
vehicle to go from his work to a place where he intends to eat, is not ordinarily within the scope of
his employment, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer, and therefore the employer is
not liable for the negligent operation of his motor
vehicle during such a trip. The mere fact that the
employee's negligence while so doing where there is
employer's motor vehicle in going to his meals does
not change this rule and render the employer liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the
employee's negligence while so doing where there is
nothing to indicate benefit to the employer, although
in some jurisdictions under such circumstances the
employer could be held to the statutory liability of
an owner for the negligence of one whom he permits
to operate his vehicle."
8 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, Section 629
An annotation in 52 ALR 2d 350 entitled "Employer's
liability for employee's negligence in operating the employer's car in going to and from work and meals" contains
the following statement of the rule concerning employees
going to meals.
Going to meals
"Rule that employee is generally not within
scope of employment.
"It has frequently been recognized that an employee using his master's car to go from his work to
a place where he intends to eat before returning to
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work is not ordinarily within the scope of his employment, in the absence of evidence of some special
business benefit to the employer from this use of
the car."
In Miller v. Hoefgen, 183 P.2d 850 (New Mexico 1947)
an employer volunteered the use of his truck to an employee
to go to lunch because the employee had worked one-half
hour past his time. The accident occurred while the employee was driving the truck to lunch. The Supreme Court
of New Mexico held that the employee was using the truck
on a personal errand and was not acting within the scope
of his employment.
The court stated :

"As we appraise the evidence in the case, the
defendant, Hoefgen, as an accommodation to the
defendant, Rinner, permitted him to use the truck
on a personal errand. Its use by the defendant,
Rinner, did not shorten the lunch perbd, nor enable
him to return to work earlier. There was no previous
understanding that Rinner would be permitted to
use the truck for working overtime. * * We, therefore, conclude that at the time of the accident Rinner
was engaged in a personal mission and that his
business relations with the defendant, Hoefgen,
were terminated, or at least suspended, prior to the
time the injuries were sustained by plaintiffs."
(Italics ours)
The act of Cox in driving home to lunch did not bestow
any business benefit on Anaconda.
In the case of Larkins v. Utah Copper Co., 127 P.2d
354 (Oregon 1942) cited by plaintiffs, the employee was
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returning from a business trip when he was involved in an
accident with the plaintiff. Although the employee had
deviated from his employment in going on a mission of his
own, the accident did not occur until after he had resumed
the work of his master.
Plaintiff's argument that Cox was in the scope of his
employment because he was subject to call is without merit.
Under this theory no employee would ever go out of the
scope of his employment because theoretically he is always
subject to call. Any employee could be called to handle a
special project or replace an absent worker. A judge could
be called to hear a special motion or sign an order. The
fact that we are all subject to call does not place us in
the scope of our employment. If the call comes, we would
not resume our employment until we are engaged in some
activity which bestowed a benefit on our employer. In the
instant case Cox did not receive a call to go on a field trip.
He had no intention of going into the field after lunch.
(R 134, 135) It is respectfully submitted that the alleged
possibility of a call is no evidence that Cox was in the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident.
Rule 56 ( c) of the amendments to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure effective October 1, 1965, contains the following provision relating to summary judgment:
" ( e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony;
Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
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thereof ref erred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him." (Italics ours)
Summary judgment is a useful tool in the administration of justice. In the instant case the facts are undisputed.
Cox's uncontroverted affidavit conclusively shows that he
was on his way home to lunch at the time of the accident.
He was not engaged in any activity which bestowed a
business benefit on his employer. The order granting summary judgment should be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have abolished the
age old distinction between special and general appearance.
The defendant is now required to raise all defenses, jurisdictional or otherwise, by motion or in the answer or they
will be waived. Cox made a "special appearance" out of an
abundance of caution to object to the proposed amendment
to the complaint on the ground he had no property in the
State of Utah which could be made the subject of an in rem
proceeding. The objection was directed at the matter of
jurisdiction over Cox. If the issue could be raised by motion,
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or answer, it could obviously be raised by specific objection.
The trial court properly held Cox had made a "special"
appearance and had not waived his objection to jurisdiction.
Cox has no "chose in action" against Travelers so there
is no property in the State of Utah which can be the subject
of an in rem proceeding. Plaintiffs have not acquired jurisdiction over Cox. Plaintiffs cannot acquire an in personam
judgment against Cox under the guise of an in rem action.
The absence of personal jurisdiction would render any
judgment against Cox a nullity and deprive him of his
property without due process of law in violation of his
constitutional rights. No action will lie against Travelers
until a judgment is obtained against Cox. The summons
served on Cox in Bethesda, Maryland, was properly
quashed.
Cox was on his way home to lunch at the time of the
accident. This activity did not confer a business benefit on
Anaconda. The alleged possibility that Cox might have been
called to go somewhere is not sufficient to place Cox in the
scope of his employment. He never did receive a call and
intended to return to the office after lunch. The order
granting summary judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for defendants
and Respondents

